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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAN CORNWALL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WILLOW CREEK COUNTRY 
CLUB, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 9568 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover compensation on 
a written personal service contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court; from a verdict 
and judgment for the ·plaintiff, defendant appeals.· 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of a portion of the 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is a professional interior decorator. 
On September 22, 1959, defendant engaged the ser-
vices of plaintiff by written contract to perform 
interior decorating services in connection with de-
fendant's new club house facilitaties located in Salt 
Lake County, Utah (the contract is part of the 
record at Pages 4 and 5). Plaintiff''s services vvere 
to include the selection of carpets, drapes, furniture, 
light fixtures, fabrics and colors, and to supervise 
the installation of the furnishings and fixtures. 
Her fee was six ( 6 7o) percent of the cost of cer-
tain of the furnishings. 
The contract was for the term of one year. 
Appellant had an option under the contract to re-
new the same for an additional year. If the con-
tract was not renewed, appellant would owe to re-
spondent the sum of $1,000.00 as additional fee. 
The contract was not renewed and defendant 
refused to pay the $1,000.00 additional fee and cer-
tain items of account not involved in this appeal. 
Suit was commenced January 24, 1961. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT ARE CLEAR 
AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND WERE PROPERLY EN-
FORCED BY THE LOWER COURT. 
Paragraph 6 of the contract provides the basis 
of contention on this appeal. It reads: 
"This con tract shall be for a term of 
one ( 1) year from the date hereof, and may 
be renewed by the Club upon the s'ame terms, 
for an additional one ( 1) year, by giving 
written notice of renewal to the decorator at 
least thirty ( 30) days prior to the date of 
expiration. In the event that the contract 
is not renewed, the Club shall pay the decor-
ator an additional fee of One Thousand 
( $1,000.00) Dollars." 
Appellant (who prepared the contract, R. 20) 
is now dissatisfied with the clear meaning and ef-
fect of Paragraph 6 and is asking this court to 
ll10dify it. 
Appellant now wants Paragraph 6 to read and 
mean that the sum of $1,000.00 would be owing 
to Miss Cornwall (respondent) only in the event 
that other work were yet to be done by the decor-
ator for which a fee would be payable. 
In this request, appellant is met squarely with 
a well settled principal of law. 
"A cour't cannot make a new contract for the 
parties". Elgren vs. Snyder, 285 Pac. 640 
(Utah). 
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"Generally speaking, neither of the parties, 
nor the court has any right to ignore or modi-
fy conditions which are clearly expressed 
merely because it may subject one of the 
parties to hardship, but they must be en-
forced "in accordance with the intention as 
... manifested by the language used by the 
parties to the contract." Ephraim Theatre 
Company vs. Hawk, 321 Pac. 2d 221 (Utah). 
In an effort to overcome the effect of these 
decisions, appellant urges that the record be searched 
and the contract construed and interpreted in the 
light of the negotiations and circumstances of the 
parties at and after the execution of the contract. 
Appellants do not, indeed can not contend that the 
contract is ambiguous as ·written, but state that it 
becomes so after reference is made to extraneous 
matters. 
Here again, appellant is confronted with well 
settled law. 
"Tt would defeat the very purpose of formal 
contracts to permit a party to invoke the use 
of words or conduct inconsistent with its 
terms to prove that the parties did not mean 
what they said, or to use such inconsistent 
words or conduct to demonstrate uncertainty 
or ambiguity where none would otherwise 
exist." Ephraim Theatre Company vs. Hawk, 
(supra). 
"Elementary it is that in construing contracts 
we seek to determine the intentions of the 
parties. But is also elementary and of ex-
treme practical importance that we hold con-
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tracting parties to their clear and under-. 
standable language deliberately committed 
to writing and endorsed by them as sig-
natories thereto . . . It is not unreasonable 
to hold one responsible for language which he 
himself espouses." Jensen's Used Cars v. 
James T. Rice, 823 P. 2d 259, (Utah). 
12 Am. Jur. Contracts §233 
"As already in tim a ted, preliminary negotia-
tions can not be allowed to contradict or vary 
the terms of a written contract.'' 
IBID. §248 
HThe foregoing rule that the surrounding cir-
cumstances should be considered in the inter-
pretation of a contract appl'ies for the langu-
age considered alone is susceptible to more 
than one meaning. All authorities agree that 
the surrounding circumstances should be con-
sidered where the meaning conveyed by the 
words alone i's not plain. That is, where the 
meaning conveyed is not plain if the surround-
ing circumstances are ndt considered. Appar-
ently, however, the rule that the surrounding 
circumstances should be considered does not 
apply where the language of a written agree-
ment is plain and is not susceptible of more 
than one meaning." (Italics supplied) 
Additionally, it should be pointed out that the 
record does not support appellant's theory that a 
condition be interpreted into Paragraph 6. 
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Appellant: (Mr. Safford who negotiated the con-
tract) 
" ... it w·as put in there for a specific pur-
pose which Miss Cornwall and I discussed on 
several different occasion's, the purpose of it 
being to make sure that the contract was 
completed." 
Respondent: 
''When I met with Norval Safford in discus-
sion pertaining to the contract, the $1,000.00 
clause was put in to assure me of adequate 
compensation for doing this .particular pro-
. ject."1 
Mr. Safford testified further on direct exam-
ination: 
"Q. Now, did you have any discussion 
with her concerning whether or not that sum 
would be paid in the event all the work was 
done-; that is, as outlined or contemplated at 
that time? 
A. To the best of my knowledge, the 
question never even -came ilp in my mind. It 
was siinply a que'stion:af completing the work." 
We thus see that the condition appellant seeks 
to engraft upon Paragraph 6 was not even a sub-
ject of discussion between the parties and the testi-
mony cited by appellant is not inconsistent with the 
enforcement of this term of the contract. 
1 Excerpts of testimony taken from Page 5 of Appellant's Brief. 
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To interpret Paragraph 6 in the manner ap-
pellant wishe's, it would be necessary to 
( 1) completely change and overrule the law 
regarding writen instruments. 
( 1) find and declare that this unambiguous 
contract is in fact ambiguous, and 
('3) without any supporting evidence, specu-
late on the intent of the parties and 
construct for them a new contract that 
neither envisioned . 
. 7 
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POlNT II. 
THE CONTRACT WAS NOT TERMINATED BY 
PERFORMANCE AS APPELLANT SUGGESTS. 
Appellant states that during the initial year of 
the contract, it was completed and, therefore, there 
was nothing to renew. rt ba:ses 'its argument on its 
claim that it had purchased all its furnishings dur-
ing the year. This argument is untenable because 
appellant has overlooked the nature of the contract, 
its terms and the testimony and exhibits of respon-
dent. 
The contract is one for services. The fee is ba:sed 
on six ( 6 7o ) percent of the purchase price of certain 
furnishings and fixtures with provisions of a mini-
mum fee and an option to renew. A primary term 
of one year is provided. One of the duties incum-
bent upon respondent during \the one year term is 
''to advise and consult with the building committee 
and work in cooperation with it (R. 4) ." Even if 
other duties under the contract such as purchase 
and installation of furnishings vvere discharged, the 
du1ty to advise and consult can not possibly be dis-
charged until the year ends. She must remain avail-
able to advise and consult with the building com-
mittee at any time during the year. 
This contract is not unlike that of an attorney 
and client contract wherein an attorney is retained 
for a period of one year for the purpose of advice 
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and prosecution of claims with provision that his 
fee would be based on a percentage of sums col-
lected. No one would contend, certainly, that the 
contract had terminated because all the claims had 
been collected in six months. 
There is, furthermore, adequate evidence that 
the contract had not been terminated by perform-
ance. 
"Q. Let me ask you this, Miss Cornwall. 
Do you consider that your services are com-
pleted for the Willow Creek Country Club? 
A. No, I do not." (R. 27) 
An exchange of letters corroborated this testi-
mony (Exhibits P9 and PlO). Miss Cornwall out-
lines certain modifications and additions, she 
thought necessary for the club house facilities. The 
President of the Club replied stating tha't she would 
probably be contacted by the building committee. 
She was not, however, contacted by the building com-
mittee.· 
A fair interpretation of the contract shows that 
it could not by its terms be terminated by perform-
ance, and furthermore, the record shows that there 
\vas work yet to be done. 
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NOTE: 
Appellant does not ask that Paragraph 6 be 
voided on the grounds that it is a penalty, but its 
repeated reference to Paragraph 6 as a "penalty 
clause" in the record and in its brief does merit 
a comment. 
This action_was brought on the cont:r:_a~t for the 
agreed compensation. It is not an action for breach 
of contract. 
The applicable rules are set forth in the Calif-
ornia case of Payne vs. Pathe Studios, 44 Pac .. 2d, 
59R (CaL).:· 
'~That the supplemental provision to pay the 
$5,000.00, as representing four weeks' guar-
antee, was neither in the nature of a penalty 
nor an· effort to proVide for liquidated dam-
ages, appears clear to us. This action is not 
one for damages based upon the breach of a 
contract of hiring, hut is an action based upon 
the contract itself, as construed and inter-
preted, upon an express promise to pay for 
at least four weeks' services ... Such agree-
ments are upheld and the minin1um rate or 
wage has been sustained as the true measure 
of recovery, the promise to pay such sum 
'being a part of the direct obligation of the 
contract and in no sense a covenant for.liqui-
da ted damages in cases of breach . . · ·. ·The 
same reasoning and authorities furnish a neg-
ative answer to appellant's question as to 
whether the pron1ise to pay the $5,000 was a 
penalty. Provisions for a penalty as well as 
for liquidated damages apply only in case of 
a breach of a con tract.'' · 
10 
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CONCLUSION 
The contract in this case was properly inter-
preted and enforced by the lower court. Its decision 
should be affir1ned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD M. GARRETT 
Attorney For Plaintiff-Respondent 
11 
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